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ABSTRACT
We develop a framework for studying trade in vertically and horizontally differentiated products. In
our model, consumers with heterogeneous incomes and tastes purchase a homogeneous good as well
as making a discrete choice of quality and variety of a differentiated product. The distribution of preferences
in the population generates a nested logit demand structure. These demands are such that the fraction
of consumers who buy a higher-quality product rises with income. We use the model to study the pattern
of trade between countries that differ in size and income distributions but are otherwise identical. Trade￿which
is driven primarily by demand factors￿derives from "home market effects" in the presence of transport
costs. The model helps to explain why richer countries export higher-quality goods. It provides a tractable
tool for studying the welfare consequences of trade, transport costs, and trade policy for different income




















International trade ￿ ows reveal systematic patterns of vertical specialization. When rich and poor
countries export goods in the same product category, the richer countries sell goods with higher
unit values (Schott, 2004; Hummels and Klenow, 2005; Hallak and Schott, 2011). This suggests a
positive association between per capita income and the quality of exports. Also, when a country
imports goods in a product category from several sources, the higher-quality goods are imported
disproportionately from the higher-income countries (Hallak, 2006). Since wealthier households
typically consume goods of higher quality (Bils and Klenow, 2001; Broda and Romalis, 2009), the
pattern of vertical specialization has important implications for the distributional consequences of
world trade.
In this paper, we propose a new analytic framework for studying trade in vertically-di⁄erentiated
products. Our approach features non-homothetic preferences over goods of di⁄erent quality, as
is suggested by the observed consumption patterns. It allows trade patterns to depend on the
distributions of income in trading partners and it implies that the welfare consequences of trade
vary across income groups in any country. It predicts that richer countries will be net exporters of
higher-quality goods and net importers of lower-quality goods under reasonable assumptions about
levels and distributions of national income. Our model implies that, in many circumstances, trade
liberalization bene￿ts the poorer households in wealthy countries and the richer households in poor
countries.
We provide a demand-based explanation for the pattern of trade in goods of di⁄erent quality.
In this respect, our approach is reminiscent of Linder (1961), who hypothesized that ￿rms in any
country produce goods suited to the predominant tastes of their local consumers and sell them
worldwide to others who share these tastes.1 Our approach complements a ￿ ourishing literature
that highlights various supply-side determinants of trade in vertically-di⁄erentiated goods. In
Markusen (1986) or Bergstrand (1990), for example, the country with higher per-capita income
exports the luxury good, because that good happens to be capital intensive. Similarly, in Flam and
Helpman (1987), Stokey (1991), Murphy and Shleifer (1997) and Matsuyama (2000), the pattern
of trade follows from an assumption that richer countries have relative technological superiority in
producing higher-quality goods.2 More recently, Baldwin and Harrigan (2007) and Johnson (2008)
have incorporated vertically-di⁄erentiated products into trade models with heterogenous ￿rms.
They seek to explain the observation that more productive ￿rms export higher-priced (and therefore,
1Mitra and Trindate (2005) also o⁄er a demand-based explanation for the pattern of trade in a model with non-
homothetic preferences. However, their model implies that countries will export goods that are little demanded
at home absent any supply-side di⁄erences between them. See also Foellmi et al. (2007), who model trade in
horizontally-di⁄erentiated goods with discrete choice and non-homothetic preferences.
2See also Fieler (2011), who ￿nds in her calibration excercise using a Ricardian framework ￿ la Eaton and Kortum
(2002) with two industries and many goods that the industry with a higher income elasticity of demand also has
the greater spread in its productivity draws. As she shows, this gives the country with the higher technology level a
comparative advantage in luxury goods.
1presumably, higher-quality) products with reference to the relatively greater incentive that such
￿rms have to undertake quality-enhancing investments. Their approach would generate a supply-
side explanation for the observed pattern of trade if richer countries are home to a disproportionate
share of the high-productivity ￿rms.3
The demand structure that we exploit has strong empirical roots. We assume that individuals
consume varying quantities of a homogeneous good and a discrete choice of a product that is both
horizontally and vertically di⁄erentiated. Consumers choose among di⁄erent quality options for
the good and from a set of distinctive products at each quality level that have idiosyncratic appeal.
The assumed form of the utility function and the distribution of tastes are such that the system of
aggregate demands exhibits a nested-logit structure. We draw on the theory of such demands that
has been developed by McFadden (1978), Anderson et al. (1992) and Verboven (1996a), among
others.4
We posit a utility function that features complementarity between the quantity of the ho-
mogeneous good and the quality of the di⁄erentiated product. This property of the assumed
preferences￿ shared also by earlier work on vertical competition by Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979,
1980) and Shaked and Sutton (1982,1983)￿ implies that the marginal value of quality is higher for
households that have greater income. We add to their speci￿cation an idiosyncratic taste compo-
nent that captures a consumer￿ s personal valuation of the attributes of each of the di⁄erentiated
products. With this addition, a wealthy consumer may fancy a particular low-quality variety while
a poorer consumer favors one of the high-quality products. In the aggregate, the fraction of con-
sumers that buys a high-quality product rises with income. This behavior generates heterogeneity
in income elasticities of demand across di⁄erent goods. Such heterogeneity has proven useful in
explaining bilateral trade ￿ ows in work by Hunter and Markusen (1988), Bergstrand (1990), Hunter
(1991), and Fieler (2011). Moreover, the horizontal product di⁄erentiation validates a market struc-
ture of monopolistic competition, which simpli￿es the analysis greatly in comparison to the earlier
literature with oligopolistic interactions.
The non-homotheticities in demand forge a link between the shape of a country￿ s income dis-
tribution and the pattern and intensity of its trade in vertically-di⁄erentiated products. We draw
out some of the implications in our analysis, much as do Flam and Helpman (1987), Matsuyama
(2000), and Mitra and Trindade (2005). Dalgin et al. (2008) and Choi et al. (2009) show that such
links between income distribution and trade patterns are important in reality.5
In our model, patterns of aggregate demand translate into patterns of specialization and trade
via ￿home-market e⁄ects.￿ In a standard competitive model with constant returns to scale, a
3See also Kugler and Verhoogen (2011) and Hallak and Sivadasan (2009), who provide empirical evidence on the
relationship between ￿rm size, ￿rm productivity, and export unit values.
4The nested-logit demand structure has been applied to international trade by Goldberg (1995) and Verboven
(1996b), and more recently by Verhoogen (2008) and Khandelwal (2010). The latter two include a vertical dimension
of product di⁄erentiation in their discussion, but their focus is very di⁄erent from ours.
5Choi et al. (2009) show that country pairs that share more similar income distributions also exhibit more similar
distributions of import prices. Dalgin et al. (2008) ￿nd a positive correlation in a sample of developed countries
between income dispersion and imports of luxury goods.
2country exports those goods for which there is little local demand and imports goods that domestic
consumers especially covet. But, as Krugman (1980) argued, when transportation is costly, a
large home market lends an advantage to local ￿rms producing under increasing returns to scale.
Therefore, countries tend to export the increasing-returns goods that are in great domestic demand.6
In our model, the demand di⁄erences are not a matter of exogenous cross-country variations in
tastes, but rather derive from di⁄erences in income distribution in the face of non-homothetic
demands. We outline conditions under which a richer country, or one with a more dispersed
distribution of income, has a larger home demand for high-quality goods and a smaller home
demand for low-quality goods. Under such conditions, more ￿rms enter to produce high-quality
goods in the richer (or more unequal) country, while the opposite is true of ￿rms producing low-
quality products. Firms at a given quality charge the same ex-factory prices, so the number of
producers predicts the direction of trade. Thus, our model can explain, for example, why Germany
traditionally has exported high-quality cars to Korea while importing low-quality cars from there.
Our framework provides a tractable and parsimonious tool for studying the distributional im-
plications of changes in transport costs or trade policy. Since di⁄erent income classes in a country
consume di⁄erent mixes of low-quality and high-quality products, the delocation of ￿rms induced by
changes in trading conditions a⁄ects the welfare of the various income classes di⁄erently. We ￿nd,
for example, that trade liberalization in a rich country tends to favor the lower-income groups there,
who bene￿t qua consumers from an expansion in the range of product o⁄erings at the low-quality
level and from a transfer of income from groups that consume greater shares of the high-quality
good.
In Section 2, we develop our framework in the context of a closed economy. Each consumer
buys one unit of some di⁄erentiated product and devotes all remaining income to the homogeneous
good. Individuals have idiosyncratic evaluations of the various di⁄erentiated products, which also
di⁄er in quality. The distribution of taste parameters generates a nested-logit structure of aggregate
demands. We combine these demands with a simple supply model that features a single factor of
production, ￿xed costs plus constant unit costs that vary by quality level, and free entry into the
di⁄erentiated-products sector. In the monopolistically-competitive equilibrium, each ￿rm producing
a di⁄erentiated product charges a ￿xed markup over its unit cost that depends on the quality
level of its product and a parameter describing the distribution of idiosyncratic tastes. We show
in Section 3 for the case of two quality levels that the autarky equilibrium is unique and that
it is characterized by positive numbers of producers of both low-quality and high-quality goods.
We proceed to examine how changes in population size and in the level and spread of the income
distribution a⁄ect the numbers of producers at each quality level and the welfare of di⁄erent income
groups.
Section 4 introduces international trade between two countries that share similar supply char-
6Hanson and Xiang (2006) extend Krugman￿ s argument to a setting with many industries that di⁄er in transport
costs and the extent of product di⁄erentiation. They provide empirical support for the proposition that larger
countries export more in industries with high transport costs and highly-di⁄erentiated products. See Davis and
Weinstein (2003) for further empirical evidence of home-market e⁄ects in the pattern of trade.
3acteristics but di⁄er in their levels and distributions of income. We assume that di⁄erentiated
products are costly to transport internationally, with per-unit shipping costs that may vary with
the quality level. When shipping costs are su¢ ciently high, as we assume throughout that section,
each country produces and trades both low-quality and high-quality goods. We examine how coun-
try sizes and income distributions combine to determine the pattern of trade. We also investigate
the distributional implications of a decline in trading costs. When such costs decline su¢ ciently,
the production of goods of a given quality must be concentrated in a single country, as we show in
Section 5. For trading costs close enough to zero, each good is produced in the country that would
have the larger home market in a hypothetical, integrated equilibrium. This implies, for example
that if countries are of equal size and the income distribution in one ￿rst-order stochastically dom-
inates that in the other, then the richer country produces and exports the higher-quality goods
while the poorer country produces and exports the lower-quality goods.
In Section 6, we study commercial policy. Tari⁄s have no e⁄ect on ex-factory prices in our
model. The welfare e⁄ects of a tari⁄ derive from a composition e⁄ect and a redistribution e⁄ect.
The former captures the change in the relative numbers of high- and low-quality products that
results from protection. The latter re￿ ects the transfer of tari⁄ revenues from import purchasers
to the average consumer.
Section 7 extends the model to include more quality levels and more countries. By doing so, we
are able to make contact with the recent empirical literature on the pattern of trade in vertically
di⁄erentiated products. We assume that countries can be ranked from poorest to richest such that
the income distributions in any pair of countries satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio property. We
show that when two countries are of similar size and trading costs are high, the richer country has
positive net exports of all of the highest quality goods and positive net imports of all the lowest
quality goods in its bilateral trading relationships with poorer countries. When trading costs are
small, each quality level generically is produced in a single country and richer countries produce
higher quality goods than poorer countries. In terms of the trade pattern, we ￿nd that among
countries of similar size, the richer countries export goods of higher quality, which is in keeping
with the empirical ￿ndings by Schott (2004) and Hummels and Klenow (2005). When trading costs
are small, a country imports higher-quality goods from richer trading partners, as Schott (2004),
Khandelwal (2010) and Hallak and Schott (2011) ￿nd to be true for U.S. imports from various
sources.
Overall, our paper makes several contributions. First, it provides a simple framework that
incorporates vertical product di⁄erentiation and non-homothetic demands. We believe that such
a framework could prove useful for studying a range of issues involving goods of di⁄erent quality.
Second, our model o⁄ers a uni￿ed explanation for many recent ￿ndings in the empirical literature
on trade in vertically di⁄erentiated products, and it o⁄ers additional predictions about bilateral
trade patterns that could be subject to empirical scrutiny. Third, our analysis yields an intuitive
and parsimonious decomposition of the welfare e⁄ects of trade liberalization or other exogenous
events on consumers at di⁄erent points in the income distribution. Accordingly, it can be used to
4address the questions raised by Broda and Romalis (2009) without the questionable assumption
that consumers￿preferences change as they grow richer. Finally, our speci￿cation of the distribution
of taste parameters is familiar from the empirical literature on household demand. We believe that
the econometric techniques that have been developed for estimating discrete choice models could be
used on household survey data to estimate the key demand-side parameters of our model. Armed
with such parameters and observable data on expenditure patterns, one could utilize our expressions
for the average welfare changes in di⁄erent income groups to calculate the gains from trade across
the income distribution.7
2 The Model
We develop a model featuring income heterogeneity and non-homothetic preferences over goods of
di⁄erent quality. We describe the model in this section, characterize its autarky equilibrium in the
next, and then move on to international trade in Sections 4-7 below.
Each individual consumes a homogeneous good and his optimal choice from a ￿nite set of
di⁄erentiated products. Both types of goods are produced with labor alone. The homogeneous
good requires one unit of e⁄ective labor per unit of output. This good is competitively priced
and serves as numeraire. The di⁄erentiated products require a ￿xed input of labor and a constant
variable input per unit of output. Monopolistic competition prevails in this industry. We assume
that the labor supply is su¢ ciently large relative to aggregate demand for di⁄erentiated products
to ensure a positive output of the numeraire good in any equilibrium. Then competition implies a
wage rate for e⁄ective labor equal to one.
The economy is populated by a continuum of individuals who are endowed with di⁄erent
amounts of e⁄ective labor. This heterogeneity in endowments generates a distribution of income.
We denote the income distribution by G, so that G(y) is the fraction of the mass N of individuals
with e⁄ective labor and wage income less than or equal to y. We assume throughout that every
individual has su¢ cient income to purchase one unit of any variety of the di⁄erentiated product,
including the most expensive, at the prevailing equilibrium prices.
Each consumer values only one unit of the di⁄erentiated product and thus faces a discrete
consumption choice. Each buys the good that o⁄ers him the highest utility, considering the prices
and characteristics of all available products. Varieties are distinguished by their quality level and
by other attributes that a⁄ect consumers￿idiosyncratic valuations. We denote by Q the ￿nite set
of available quality levels and index quality by q.
7See Porto (2006) for an ambitious attempt to estimate the distributional impacts of trade policy in a model that
includes heterogeneous consumer gains as well as wage and income e⁄ects. Porto does not alllow for non-homothetic
demands, but rather he takes the variation in budget shares for di⁄erent households to be an exogenous re￿ ection of
heterogeneous tastes.
52.1 Preferences and Demand
Let j index the individual varieties of the di⁄erentiated product and let Jq denote the set of varieties
with quality q. In this notation, the variety index identi￿es both the quality of the good and its
other attributes, so that if j has quality q, then j 2 Jq and j = 2 Jq0 for q0 6= q.
Now consider the utility uh
j that an individual h would attain by consuming z units of the
homogenous good and variety j 2 Jq of the di⁄erentiated product. We assume that
uh
j = zq + "h
j for j 2 Jq; (1)
where "h
j is the individual￿ s idiosyncratic evaluation of the particular attributes of variety j. Each
individual has a vector of idiosyncratic evaluations, one for each of the available varieties; denote
this vector by "h. The utility function in (1) features complementarity between the quantity
of the homogeneous good and the quality of the di⁄erentiated product, much as a ￿standard￿
utility function (e.g., Cobb-Douglas or CES) features complementarity between the quantities of
the various goods in the individual￿ s consumption basket.8 The complementarity between quantity
and quality implies a greater marginal valuation of quality for those who consume more of the
homogeneous good. This common property of the utility function generates the non-homotheticity
of aggregate demands in our model.9 Meanwhile, the additive utility component captures the
horizontal product di⁄erentiation, which the heterogeneous consumers evaluate di⁄erently. The
horizontal product di⁄erentiation validates our assumption of a monopolistically competitive market
structure.
We take the " terms to be distributed independently across the population of consumers ac-
cording to a Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) distribution, which we denote by G" ("). That
is,









with ￿q 2 (0;1) for all q 2 Q. This distribution of taste parameters is common in the discrete-choice
literature, following Ben Akiva (1973) and McFadden (1978), because it generates a convenient and
empirically-estimable system of demands.10
Now consider the optimization problem facing an individual with income yh and vector of taste
parameters "h. Of course, this individual simply chooses the quality and variety that yields the






where pj is the price of variety j. Here yh ￿pj represents the amount of (residual) income that the
individual devotes to spending on the numeraire good after buying one unit of his most preferred
8This feature of our formulation is quite common in the earlier literature on vertical competition in oligopoly; see,
for example, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979,1980) and Shaked and Sutton (1982,1983), who use the utility function
u = zq (in our notation). We add horizontal di⁄erentiation in the form of the idiosyncratic taste component, which
greatly simpli￿es the analysis.
9If, in contrast to (1), the quantity of the homogeneous good and the quality of the di⁄erentiated product were to
enter the utility function as substitutes, this would have the counterfactual implication that the fraction of consumers
that purchases a high-quality good declines with income.
10See also Verboven (1996a) and Train (2003, ch4).
6variety of the di⁄erentiated product. The calculations in McFadden (1978) and elsewhere imply
that, with " distributed according to a GEV, the fraction of individuals with income y who choose
variety j with quality q is given by






is the fraction of consumers that buys variety j among those that purchase a di⁄erentiated product










is the fraction of consumers with income y that opts for a product of this quality. The fraction
of individuals that buys a good with quality q varies by income level and with the vector of all
product prices, whereas the fraction that buys a particular variety j 2 Jq conditional on the choice
of quality q depends only on the prices of the goods in this quality segment.
Readers familiar with the empirical literature on discrete-choice modeling will recognize the
implied demand system as a nested logit, with choice over quality levels (the ￿nest￿ ) and over
horizontally-di⁄erentiated varieties with a given quality. In that literature, ￿q is known as the
dissimilarity parameter; it measures the degree of heterogeneity in preferences over the varieties
in the set Jq.11 The greater is ￿q, the smaller is the correlation between "j and "j0 for j and j0
in Jq (see McFadden, 1978), and therefore the greater are the perceived di⁄erences among the
various varieties with quality q. It is typically the case that higher-quality products embody richer
sets of product characteristics, which expands the scope for horizontal di⁄erentiation. If so, the
varieties of a lower-quality good will be closer substitutes for one another than the varieties of a
higher-quality good. We shall assume that this is the case in what follows; i.e., we adopt
Assumption 1 ￿q is increasing in q.
Variation in the spending pattern across income groups arises solely from variation in the
fraction of individuals who purchase the products at di⁄erent levels of quality q, as re￿ ected by the











= q ￿ qa (y) for j 2 Jq; (5)
11Readers familiar with the trade literature will also recognize a similarity between the distribution of preference
shocks here and the distribution of productivity shocks in the Ricardian model of Eaton and Kortum (2002). In their
work, the productivity shocks are assumed to have a Type-II extreme value distribution in which ￿ parameterizes the






is the average quality consumed by all individuals with income y. Equation (5) implies that the
fraction of individuals who purchase brand j of quality q rises with income if and only if q > qa (y);
that is, if and only if q is above the average quality consumed by individuals in this income group.
In particular, in the case of two quality levels, Q = fH;Lg, we have H > qa (y) > L for all y, so
that the fraction of individuals who purchase high-quality products rises with income at all income
levels. This is the key property of these non-homothetic preferences that will guide our analysis of
the trade ￿ ows.
2.2 Pricing and Pro￿ts
Firms can enter freely into the di⁄erentiated-products sector by choosing any quality level q 2 Q
and by employing a ￿xed input of fq units of e⁄ective labor to develop a particular variety. A
producer uses cq units of labor per unit of output to produce a good of quality q. Firms set prices
to maximize pro￿ts taking aggregate price indexes as given. Entry at each quality level proceeds
until the next entrant would fail to cover its ￿xed cost. Let nq be the number of ￿rms that produce
goods of quality q. The demand structure requires the number of brands in each quality class to be
a ￿nite integer, but we will take liberty in treating nq as if it were a continuous variable to facilitate
the exposition.
A ￿rm that produces a variety j of the di⁄erentiated product with quality q earns pro￿ts of




is the aggregate demand for variety j 2 Jq and E is
the expectations operator with respect to the distribution of income, i.e., E[B (y)] ￿
R
B(y)dG(y).
Note that demand can be expressed as a function of prices using (2), (3), and (4). If the number
of active producers of each quality level is large, then terms in the various sums in (3) and (4)
vary only slightly with a ￿rm￿ s own price. We assume that the ￿rm ignores this dependence, as is
common in models of monopolistic competition. Then a ￿rm producing any brand j with quality
q maximizes pro￿ts by setting the price
pq = cq +
￿q
q
for q 2 Q: (6)
Evidently, the markup over marginal cost di⁄ers for goods of di⁄erent qualities. The markup re￿ ects
two properties of the class of goods. First, the higher is q, the greater is the marginal utility from
consumption of the homogeneous good, due to the complementarity between z and q re￿ ected in
(1). A higher marginal utility from consumption of the homogeneous good makes consumers more
sensitive to price di⁄erences when choosing among the di⁄erent brands in Jq. Second, the greater
is ￿q, the greater are the perceived di⁄erences among the various brands with quality q, as we have
noted before. This greater degree of product di⁄erentiation tends to make demands less sensitive
to price changes. These two forces work in opposition as they a⁄ect price setting; the markup on
8high-quality goods will be greater than that on low-quality goods if and only if ￿q=q is increasing
in q.
With common prices, the ￿rms that produce di⁄erent varieties of a good in a given quality
segment achieve similar volumes of sales. Let dq be the total quantity demanded of a typical













; for q 2 Q; (7)
where
￿q (y) ￿ e(y￿cq)q￿￿q
captures the e⁄ect of income on demand. The markups of ￿q=q on sales of dq yield a common pro￿t















￿ fq; for q 2 Q: (8)
These functions determine the pro￿tability of entry at each quality level. In equilibrium, nq > 0
implies ￿q = 0 while ￿q ￿ 0 when nq = 0. In the next section, we will use these free-entry conditions
to characterize an equilibrium in a closed economy. Once the number of ￿rms producing at a given
quality level is known, sales of each brand of the di⁄erentiated products also are determined.
Together, the ￿rms selling goods with quality q capture aggregate sales of nqdq, so that aggregate
output of all di⁄erentiated products is
P
q2Q nqdq = N. This equality re￿ ects the fact that each of
the mass N of consumers buys one unit of some product.
The di⁄erentiated-products industry employs a total of
P
q2Q nq (dqcq + fq) units of e⁄ective
labor. The di⁄erence between aggregate labor supply￿ which equals N times the mean value of y￿
and labor use in the di⁄erentiated-products industry gives the labor used in producing homogeneous
goods. The market for homogeneous products clears by Walras￿Law. Therefore, once we solve
for the number of ￿rms of each type in the di⁄erentiated-products industry, the remainder of the
variables determined in the general equilibrium are readily found.
3 Autarky Equilibrium
To characterize an equilibrium in a closed economy, we de￿ne xq as the quantity that a ￿rm





for q 2 Q: (9)
Notice that the break-even volume depends only on the magnitude of the ￿xed cost and the size of
the markup, as in Krugman (1980). So, (9) will pin down the output per variety for any quality of
9good that is available in equilibrium.
In an autarky equilibrium, if some positive number of ￿rms produce goods with quality q the
demand per brand must reach the break-even level. Otherwise, no ￿rm producing this quality can
pro￿tably enter. In other words, if nq > 0, dq = xq, whereas dq < xq implies nq = 0. In any case,
the aggregate output of all di⁄erentiated products matches the population size N, or
X
q2Q
nqxq = N. (10)
We will refer to this equation as the aggregate demand condition. It implies, of course, that nq
must be positive for some q 2 Q.
But notice from (7) that as nq approaches zero with nq0 > 0 for some q0 6= q, the demand for
a typical brand with quality q grows in￿nitely large. This means that a producer of a brand with
quality q will certainly be able to achieve the break-even scale when the number of its competitors
o⁄ering a similar quality is su¢ ciently small. In equilibrium, some positive number of ￿rms will be
active in every segment of the market.12
Now that we know that nq must be positive for all q 2 Q, market-clearing for each brand










; for q 2 Q. (11)
Using xq from (9), this system of equations allows us to solve for the number of varieties at each
quality level in an autarkic equilibrium:13
We turn now to the special case with two quality levels, H and L, where H > L; we will return
to the more general case with an arbitrary number of qualities in Section 7 below. With only
two quality levels, (11) represents a pair of equations that together determine nH and nL. In the
appendix we show that these equations have a unique solution, which is characterized by positive
values for nH and nL. This establishes
Proposition 1 If Q = fH;Lg, there exists a unique autarky equilibrium. In the autarky equilib-
rium, nH > 0 and nL > 0.
In the remainder of this section, we describe how the autarky equilibrium re￿ ects the size of the
economy and its income distribution.14 We also show how the model can be used to examine the
welfare implications of changes in the economic environment for di⁄erent income groups. These
12In making this statement, we have ignored the integer constraint. The equilibrium ￿solution￿for some nq might
be a fraction, in which case it might not be pro￿table for the ￿rst ￿whole￿ ￿rm to enter in a quality segment.
Moreover, we have assumed that many ￿rms compete in order to justify our assumption that ￿rms take price indexes
as given. We will not divert attention to these details, but instead restrict ourselves to parameters for which our
focus on an equilibrium with nq > 0 for all q 2 Q is well justi￿ed.
13Note that the weighted sum of xq from (11) implies (10), which means that only the equations in (11) need be
used to solve for the equilibrium numbers of varieties.
14The algebra of the comparative statics that we describe here is derived more formally in the appendix.
10properties of the model will aid us in understanding the direction and distributional implications
of trade in the sections that follow.
The size of the economy is captured by the parameter N. As N increases, the demand in each
quality segment grows, given the initial numbers of ￿rms; see (7). Were it the case that the two
quality segments o⁄ered similarly di⁄erentiated products (￿H = ￿L), the demand expansion would
induce equiproportionate entry by both types of ￿rms. Inasmuch as high-quality products are more
dissimilar than low-quality products by Assumption 1, there must be proportionately more entry of
￿rms that produce the former goods relative to the latter; i.e., ^ nH > ^ N > ^ nL.15. It is even possible
that the number of low-quality producers will fall (^ nL < 0) as the total market grows, in response to
intensi￿ed competition from an expanded number of high-quality producers. As in other contexts,
growth in market size causes an expansion in variety of the more horizontally-di⁄erentiated products
and may cause a contraction in variety of the less-di⁄erentiated products.16
Now consider an upward shift in the income distribution in the sense of ￿rst-order stochastic
dominance; i.e., at every income level y, the fraction of the population with income less than or equal
to y declines. Added income makes consumers more likely to buy a high-quality product across the
entire income distribution. Thus, at the initial numbers of ￿rms, demand for high-quality varieties
grows and that for low-quality varieties shrinks. This shift in demand induces entry of ￿rms that
produce high-quality goods and exit of producers of low-quality products; i.e., ^ nH > 0 > ^ nL.
Finally, consider an increase in income inequality, as represented by a mean-preserving spread of
the distribution G(￿). The e⁄ect on relative demand is in general ambiguous, as those at the top end
of the distribution collectively buy more of the high-quality goods while those at the bottom end do
just the opposite. However, if the initial equilibrium is such that a majority of every income class
purchases low-quality products, the relative demand for high-quality goods is a concave function of
y for given nH and nL. Then, a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of y causes the relative
demand for high-quality goods to expand, inducing entry of producers of these varieties and exit
of producers of low-quality products. A spread in income distribution in a poor economy (one in
which ￿L(y) > ￿H(y) for all y) induces a shift in the composition of ￿rms toward producers of
high-quality products.17
We can readily examine the implications of these shifts for the welfare of di⁄erent income groups.
As McFadden (1978) has shown, the expected welfare among those with income y increases with
v(y) ￿ n
￿H
H ￿H (y) + n
￿L
L ￿L (y) . (12)
As market conditions change,
^ v (y) = ￿H (y)￿H^ nH + ￿L (y)￿L^ nL .
15We use a circum￿ ex to denote a proportional increase; i.e., ^ Z = dZ=Z.
16See Epifani and Gancia (2006) and Hanson and Xiang (2004) for similar results in a di⁄erent context.
17See the appendix for the details.
11In words, the change in average welfare at income y weights the changes in the number of products
in each quality class by the probability that a consumer with income y purchases a good of that
class times the degree of horizontal di⁄erentiation (dissimilarity) within the class.
From the aggregate demand condition (10), ￿H^ nH +￿L^ nL = ^ N, where ￿q = nqdq=N = nqxq=N
is the fraction of the overall population that purchases a good of quality q. Using this equation, we
can write


















(^ nH ￿ ^ nL) . (13)
The ￿rst term in the expression for ^ v (y) is a pure scale e⁄ect. Holding constant the relative number
of high-quality and low-quality products, an expansion of scale bene￿ts consumers at all income
levels, because it increases the number of varieties and therefore increases the likelihood that an
individual will ￿nd one to his liking. The second term is a pure composition e⁄ect. For a given
scale, an increase in the relative number of high-quality products bene￿ts those who are more likely
than average to consume such a product and harms those who are more likely than average to
consume a low-quality product. An increase in the variety of high-quality products relative to the
variety of low-quality products is more likely to bene￿t a given income group the more dissimilar
are the brands of high-quality products and the more similar are the brands of low-quality products.
Now let us examine the distributional implications of the market changes we described above.
An increase in population size generates a scale e⁄ect that bene￿ts all income groups and a com-
position e⁄ect that especially bene￿ts the wealthy (since growth in market size generates an in-
crease in the relative number of high-quality varieties when ￿H > ￿L). The richest consumers
in the economy, who have income ymax, are more likely to purchase the high-quality good than
the average consumer and are less likely to purchase the low-quality good, which implies that
￿H (ymax)=￿H > 1 > ￿L (ymax)=￿L. By (13), these wealthy individuals must gain on average from
population growth. The poorest consumers￿ who are more likely than average to purchase the
low-quality good and less likely than average to consume the high-quality good￿ will gain if ￿L is
su¢ ciently close to ￿H; but can lose otherwise.
An upward shift in the income distribution (or a spread of the distribution in a poor economy)
generates a shift in the composition of di⁄erentiated products toward high-quality goods, without
changing the output-weighted number of products. With ￿H > ￿L, the associated composition e⁄ect
must bene￿t the members of the highest income group (on average). As for the poorest consumers,
they too may bene￿t if high-quality goods are substantially more dissimilar than low-quality goods,
but will lose if ￿H and ￿L are quite close in size. Although the low-income individuals are more likely
to consumer a low-quality product, the contraction of variety in this market segment will not hurt
them so much if these goods are relatively similar to one another; meanwhile, the expansion in the
variety of high-quality products can be quite advantageous even to these consumers (on average),
if the idiosyncratic tastes for the various high-quality products are little correlated. If there are
income groups that lose from a change in the composition of products that favors high-quality
12goods, it will be all groups with income less than or equal to some critical value.
4 Trade with Diversi￿ed Production
In this section, we introduce international trade. We assume for the time being that there are two
countries that di⁄er in size and in their distributions of e¢ ciency labor. We do not allow for any
supply-side determinants of the trade pattern as would arise from comparative cost advantages in
order to focus more sharply on those that derive from di⁄erences in income in the face of non-
homothetic preferences. We designate the countries as R and P to suggest ￿rich￿ and ￿poor,￿
although we do not insist on any particular relationship between their sizes or their income distri-
butions except in some special cases. In Section 7, we will extend the analysis to many countries
in order to make contact with the empirical evidence cited in the Introduction.
We assume throughout that both (or all) countries have su¢ cient supplies of e⁄ective labor
relative to the equilibrium labor demands by their producers of di⁄erentiated products so that
some labor in each country is used to produce the homogeneous, numeraire good. This ensures
that the wage of a unit of e⁄ective labor is equal to one in both (all) countries.
We assume that the di⁄erentiated products are costly to trade.18 In particular, it takes ￿q units
of e⁄ective labor to ship one unit of a variety with quality q from one country to another.19 As
￿q grows large, national outputs converge on those of the autarky equilibria. In such a setting,
as we now know, both countries produce goods in both quality segments. We will ￿nd that such
incomplete specialization characterizes the trade equilibrium whenever trading costs are su¢ ciently
high. These are the circumstances that we consider now, whereas in the next section we will study
equilibria in which each quality level is produced in only one country, as happens almost surely
when shipping costs are small.20
Shipping requirements raise the cost of serving foreign consumers relative to domestic con-
sumers. For a good with quality q, the marginal cost of a delivered export unit is cq + ￿q, whereas
local consumers can be supplied at a cost of cq. The arguments from Section 2.2 now imply that a
￿rm producing a brand with quality q maximizes pro￿ts by charging foreign consumers the price
cq +￿q +￿q=q, whereas domestic consumers are charged the lower price cq +￿q=q (see (6)). In other
words, mark-ups are ￿q=q for all sales, as ￿rms fully pass on their shipping costs to their foreign
18Davis (1998) has shown that a home-market e⁄ect may not exist if di⁄erentiated products and homogeneous
goods bear similar trading costs. But Amiti (1998) and Hanson and Xiang (2004) demonstrate that the home-market
e⁄ect requires only that transport costs di⁄er across sectors.
19Unlike models of monopolistic competition that rely on the CES demand system, our model easily allows for
transport costs that are incurred on a per-unit basis. Although we consider this to be more realistic than the popular
assumption of ￿iceberg￿transport costs, there is no meaningful di⁄erence between the two in our model. In either
case, ￿rms price their exports at a ￿xed markup per unit over the delivered cost.
20It is common in trade models featuring a home-market e⁄ect that production is geographically dispersed when
transport costs are large, but each good is produced in only one location when transport costs are small; see, for
example, Krugman (1991a, 1991b) and Rossi-Hansberg (2005). The implications for the trade pattern are somewhat
di⁄erent in these two regimes￿ especially when the number of quality levels and countries is large￿ which explains
why we consider both possibilities.
13customers.21
Demands for domestic goods of quality q in country k re￿ ect the prices of these goods, the prices
of competing import goods, and the numbers of local and imported varieties at each quality level.
Letting dk
q represent the aggregate demand by domestic consumers for a typical good of quality q





















q, ‘ 6= k,
￿q ￿ e￿￿qq=￿q,
nk
q is the number of varieties of quality q produced in country k, Nk is the population in country
k, and Ek is the expectation with respect to the income distribution there. Notice the similarity
between (14) and (7). Now, domestic brands share the market with both domestic and foreign rivals
but, inasmuch as imports of a given quality bear a higher price due to shipping costs, the foreign
brands are less e⁄ective competitors. For local ￿rms, domestic demand is the same as it would be
in autarky with ~ nk
q local competitors producing quality q. The foreign ￿rms are discounted in this
measurement of ￿e⁄ective competitors￿by an amount ￿q 2 (0;1) that re￿ ects the trading cost for
goods of quality q as well as the quality and dissimilarity of these products. Also, (4) implies that
per capita demand for an imported variety of quality q in country k equals ￿qdk
q=Nk; i.e., it is a
fraction ￿q of the per capita demand faced by a local ￿rm.
A ￿rm producing a variety with quality q in either country earns pro￿ts per sale of ￿q=q,
considering the ￿xed mark-up it charges over delivered cost. In order to break even, such a ￿rm,
no matter where it is located, must make sales totalling xq = fqq=￿q units, as per (9). In an
equilibrium with producers of both qualities in both countries, we must have
xq = dk
q + ￿qd‘
q , k;‘ = R;P, ‘ 6= k, q = H;L.
The right-hand side of this equation represents total sales by a ￿rm located in country k, comprising
domestic sales and exports sales, where the latter are a fraction ￿q of what a local producer in
country ‘ makes of domestic sales. For these equations to hold for both k = P and k = R it
must be that dR
q = dP
q for q = H;L; that is, ￿rms in each country must achieve the same volume
of domestic sales. Since the size and the income distributions in the two countries may di⁄er,
21If transportation costs instead took the iceberg form￿ such that the delivery of one unit of a good of quality q
to an export market required that ￿q > 1 units be shipped, then the pro￿t-maximizing price for export sales would
instead be cq￿q+￿q=q. The analysis would proceed exactly as in what follows. The ability of our model to accomodate
both per unit or iceberg shipping costs re￿ ects the fact that optimal markups under the nested logit demand system
are constant and independent of delivered cost. In contrast, models with CES demands imply a markup that is
proportional to the delivered cost, in which case per-unit and proportional shipping costs have di⁄erent e⁄ects on
export prices.
14the equality must be achieved by adjustment in the numbers of e⁄ective ￿rms in each market. In
particular, the equality between the required volume of total sales and the total demand faced by
producers in market k implies xq = dk
















; q = H;L, k = R;P. (15)
The equations in (15) provide four independent relationships, two for country R that jointly
determine ~ nR
L and ~ nR
H and two for country P that jointly determine ~ nP
L and ~ nP
H. These equations
have exactly the same form as those in (11) that describe the autarky equilibrium, except that xq
for the closed economy is replaced by xq=(1 + ￿q) for the open economy. The proof of Proposition
1 guarantees that (15) has a unique solution with a positive number of e⁄ective ￿rms of each type
in each country.
It is not enough, of course, that the number of e⁄ective ￿rms in each country be positive for
the solutions to (15) to represent a legitimate trade equilibrium. We require in addition that the
actual number of varieties in each country be positive. Given the values of ~ nR
L, ~ nR
H, ~ nP
L, and ~ nP
H
that result from the solution of (15), we can solve for nk
L and nk







q ￿ ￿q~ n‘
q
1 ￿ (￿q)
2 , k;‘ = R;P, ‘ 6= k, q = H;L. (16)
A positive solution for nk








> ￿q , k;‘ = R;P, ‘ 6= k, q = H;L,
which is always satis￿ed when ￿q is close to zero but rarely satis￿ed when ￿q is close to one.22
This justi￿es our claim that a trade equilibrium with incomplete specialization always exists when
transport costs are su¢ ciently high, but fails to exist (generically) when transport costs are low.
The trade equilibrium with incomplete specialization features intra-industry trade at each qual-
ity level. Some consumers in R opt for preferred varieties of the high-quality good produced in
P, despite their higher price that includes a charge for shipping. Similarly, some consumers in R
choose to import a favorite foreign variety of the low-quality good. Consumers in P will likewise
import high-quality and low-quality goods produced in R.
In fact, we know that the export sales by a typical producer of quality q are the same in both
locations. Therefore, country R exports more of goods of quality q to P than it imports of that
quality if and only if country R has more ￿rms producing goods of quality q than does country P.
But, from (16), nR
q > nP
q if and only if ~ nR
q > ~ nP
q . Therefore, we can identify the equilibrium trade
balance in each quality class by comparing the e⁄ective number of sellers of that quality in the two
22When ￿q is close to one, the pair of inequalities can be satis￿ed only if ~ n
R
q ￿ ~ n
P
q , which happens only under
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The pair of equations that determine ~ nR
q and ~ nP
q are identical to those that determine the
autarky numbers of producers of quality q in R and P, except that xq in the latter is replaced by
xq=(1 + ￿q) in the former. Therefore, we can use the comparative statics of the autarky equilibrium
to identify the sectoral imbalances of the trade equilibrium with incomplete specialization. For
example, suppose that the countries have the same distributions of income (GR = GP) but country
R is larger than country P (i.e., NR > NP). We have seen that the larger country has in autarky
a greater relative abundance of ￿rms that produce high-quality goods, because market growth
generates biased entry in favor of the more horizontally di⁄erentiated products. It follows that
the larger country must have absolutely more producers of high-quality goods in autarky, whereas
it may support fewer (or more) producers of low-quality products. These comparisons carry over
to the numbers of e⁄ective sellers in a trade equilibrium with incomplete specialization. That is,
~ nR
H > ~ nP
H, while the comparison of e⁄ective numbers of producers of low-quality goods can run in
either direction. In such circumstances, the larger country is a net exporter of high-quality goods
but may be a net exporter or a net importer of low-quality products.
Now suppose that the two countries are identical in size (NR = NP) but the income distribution
in the richer R ￿rst-order stochastically dominates that in poorer P. Then, in autarky, the rich
country has more ￿rms producing high-quality goods and the poor country has more ￿rms producing
low-quality goods. These comparisons carry over to the e⁄ective numbers of ￿rms in the trade
equilibrium with incomplete specialization, so that ~ nR
H > ~ nP
H and ~ nP
L > ~ nR
L. It follows that the rich
country R is a net exporter of high-quality goods and a net-importer of low-quality goods.
Finally, suppose that a majority of consumers at every income level in both countries purchase
low-quality goods. Let the countries be of similar size and with similar mean income, but suppose
that the income distribution in R is more spread than that in P. As we have seen before, R has
more producers of high-quality goods and fewer producers of low-quality goods than does P in
autarky. With costly trade, R becomes a net exporter of high-quality goods and a net importer of
low-quality goods.
We summarize our ￿ndings about the pattern of trade in
Proposition 2 If trade costs are su¢ ciently high, there exists a unique trade equilibrium in which
each country produces both high- and low-quality di⁄erentiated products. In this equilibrium, (i) if
NR > NP and GR (y) = GP (y) for all y, then R exports on net the high-quality goods but may
export or import on net the low-quality goods; (ii) if NR = NP and GR(y) < GP(y) for all y, then
R exports on net the high-quality goods and imports on net the low-quality goods; (iii) if NR = NP,


































16￿L(y) > ￿H(y) for all income groups in R and P, and GR (￿) is a mean-preserving spread of GP (￿),
then R exports on net the high-quality goods and imports on net the low-quality goods.
Proposition 2 can be understood in terms of the ￿home-market e⁄ect￿described by Krugman
(1980). Take for example the case in which the countries are of similar size but the income distri-
bution in R ￿rst-order stochastically dominates that in P. The greater income in R compared to
P provides this country with a larger home market for high-quality goods. If the same numbers
of producers of high-quality goods were to enter in both countries, those in R would earn greater
pro￿ts than those in P, thanks to their ability to serve more consumers with sales that do not
bear shipping costs. In order that producers of high-quality goods in both countries break even,
there must be greater entry of such producers in the rich country, so that their ￿ner division of the
market o⁄sets their local-market advantage. The same is true in the market for low-quality goods,
where producers in P enjoy an advantage due to their closer proximity to the larger market. Access
to a large home market a⁄ords a competitive advantage that induces entry and ultimately dictates
the pattern of trade.
We turn now to the e⁄ects of a reduction in trade costs, focusing particularly on the distrib-
utional consequences. For concreteness, consider ￿rst a decline in the cost of transporting high-
quality goods.24 A fall in ￿H induces an increase in ￿H. It is clear from (15) that such an increase
in ￿H generates the same outcomes as would a reduction in the ￿xed cost of entry for producers
of high-quality products, fH. As ￿H falls, pro￿tability rises for ￿rms that produce high-quality
varieties. The number of e⁄ective producers of such varieties rises in each country. This expansion
in ~ nR
H and ~ nP
H reduces demand for low-quality goods in each country, and so there is e⁄ective exit
from this market segment. In the new trade equilibrium, there is more e⁄ective variety of high-
quality goods in each country, and less e⁄ective variety of low-quality products. The e⁄ects of a
reduction in the cost of transporting low-quality goods are analogous.
It is also evident from (15) that an equiproportionate rise in 1 + ￿H and 1 + ￿L has the same
impact on the e⁄ective number of high- and low-quality products in country k as would a similar
percentage increase in that country￿ s population. From our analysis of the autarky equilibrium, we
know that the e⁄ective number of high-quality products expands more than in proportion to the
increase in 1+￿H and 1+￿L, whereas the e⁄ective number of low-quality products can rise or fall.
What are the welfare implications of these induced changes in the e⁄ective numbers of brands?











￿L (y), for k = R;P.
Welfare of individuals in country k depends on the e⁄ective numbers of brands available there, with
foreign brands carrying less weight than domestic brands due to their higher prices. Di⁄erentiating
the expression for vk (y) and rearranging terms, we can derive an expression for the change in
24The details of the algebra are provided in the appendix.
17average welfare of an income group analogous to (13), namely












































, for k = R;P, (17)
where ￿k
q(y) is the fraction of consumers in country k with income y that buys a good with quality
q and ￿k
q is the fraction of all consumers in country k that buys a good with quality q. The term in
the ￿rst line of (17) is a pure cost-savings e⁄ect, analogous to the scale e⁄ect in (13). The term in
the second line of (17) is a pure composition e⁄ect, analogous to the similarly-named term in (13).
The cost-savings e⁄ect bene￿ts consumers at all levels of income; it re￿ ects the fact that, for given
relative numbers of e⁄ective brands of each quality, a fall in the cost of trade facilitates entry of new
producers, which expands the range of available varieties and so the probability that a consumer will
￿nd one especially to his liking. The composition e⁄ect impacts di⁄erent income classes di⁄erently.
An expansion in the e⁄ective variety of high-quality goods relative to the e⁄ective variety of low-
quality goods bene￿ts those who are more likely to consume a high-quality product but harms those
who are more likely to consume a low-quality product; and, of course, the likelihood of consuming
a high-quality good rises with income.
Let us return to the e⁄ects of a reduction in trade costs. Consider ￿rst a decline in the cost
of transporting high-quality goods. As we have seen, such a decline in ￿H expands the e⁄ective
number of high-quality brands in each country, while contracting the e⁄ective number of low-quality
brands. The cost-savings e⁄ect bene￿ts all consumers. Since ￿H > ￿L, the composition e⁄ect must
bene￿t the average member of the highest income group in each economy, but it may harm the
average member of the lowest income group. It follows that a fall in ￿H augments the average
welfare of the wealthiest consumers in each country, but may bring harm to income groups below
some critical level.25
Other reductions in trade costs can be analyzed similarly. For example, declines in ￿H and ￿L
that increase 1+￿H and 1+￿L by the same proportions must bene￿t all income groups if the dis-
similarity parameters are almost the same for the two classes of goods; if, however, the high-quality
goods are much more dissimilar as a group than the low-quality goods, such an equiproportionate
increase in 1+￿H and 1+￿L must bene￿t the highest income group in each country but can harm
the poor.
Our analysis also sheds lights on the distribution of the gains from trade. The autarky equi-
librium for either country is the solution to (15) with ￿H = ￿L = 0. The e⁄ects of trade can be
found by integrating the increases in ￿H and ￿L from zero to their actual levels. This generates
a cost-savings e⁄ect that bene￿ts all consumers. It also generates a composition e⁄ect that may
25There must be some income groups that gain from a reduction in ￿H. To see this, suppose the opposite were
true. Then, the left-hand side of (15) increases for q = L inasmuch as the numerator increases at every y (because
~ nL falls) and the denominator falls at every y (because average welfare has been assumed to fall). But the right-hand
side of (15) is unchanged, which contradicts the requirement for equilibrium in the market for low-quality goods.
18bene￿t some income groups at the expense of others. If the e⁄ective number of brands at both
quality levels rises as a result of trade, then all consumers must gain. If the e⁄ective number of
brands of some quality level declines, then income groups that buy this good with a probability
that exceeds the economy-wide average may lose. Although trade may not bene￿t every income
group, it always bene￿ts some such groups.26
We summarize our discussion of the distributional consequences of a reduction in trade costs in
Proposition 3 In a trade equilibrium with incomplete specialization, a decline in the trade cost
￿q raises the e⁄ective number of brands of quality q and reduces the e⁄ective number of brands of
quality q0, q0 6= q, in both countries. Any reduction in trade costs must bene￿t the average member of
some income group. If, as a result of a reduction in trade costs, the e⁄ective number of high-quality
(low-quality) varieties falls in some country, then the highest-income (lowest-income) groups in that
country may lose.
We conclude this section with numerical examples that illustrate some of the points we have
made. Figure 1 shows a case in which all income groups gain from a fall in the transport cost for
high-quality goods. To generate this ￿gure, we have assumed that income in each country has a
displaced Gamma distribution, with yR
min = yP
min = 1, yR
median ￿ 5:15, and yP
median ￿ 2:38.27 In the
Figure 1: Increase in ￿H: All consumers gain
left-hand panel, the ￿gure shows the e⁄ective numbers of high- and low-quality varieties in R as
￿H is raised from zero to 0.8, while ￿L is held constant at 0.5.28 The right-hand panel shows the
average welfare among those with the lowest income in R and among those with the median income
there. In drawing the ￿gure, we have normalized the (average) welfare level for each income group
to equal 100 when ￿H = 0. The rich gain proportionately more than the poor from a fall in ￿H
26The proof of this statement follows along similar lines to that used in footnote 25.
27The example takes N
R = N
P = 1000, H = 1:05, L = 0:9, ￿H = 0:7, ￿L = 0:5, ￿L = 0:5, fH = 5, fL = 1:5,
cH = 0:3, and cL = 0:05: The distributions of income are such that y ￿ 1 has a Gamma distribution in each country,
with a coe¢ cient of variation equal to 1 in each case. We take the scale parameter in R to be 6 and that in P to be
2, so that mean incomes are 7 and 3, respectively.
28For ￿H > 0:8 in this example, P specializes in the production of low-quality goods.
19thanks to the composition e⁄ect that re￿ ects the rise in the e⁄ective variety of high-quality goods
and the fall in the e⁄ective variety of low-quality goods. Nonetheless, even the poorest consumers
bene￿t from a fall in transport costs in this case. The ￿gures for the poor country P (not shown)
are qualitatively similar.
Figure 2 illustrates the possibility of distributional con￿ ict. This ￿gure uses the same distri-
butions of income in the two countries as above, but it depicts a case in which the high-quality
products are less di⁄erentiated (and the low-quality products more so) than before, so that the
composition e⁄ect is more damaging to the poor.29 Here, the median income group in country R
gains from a reduction in the cost of trading high-quality goods, but the lowest income group in R
loses. Again, the ￿gures for the poor country look qualitatively similar.
Figure 2: Increase in ￿H: Rich gain but poor lose
Finally, Figure 3 illustrates the patterns of specialization for di⁄erent values of ￿H and ￿L. The
￿gure is drawn for the same parameters as underlie Figure 1. In this case, the countries are similar
in size but consumers in R are richer than their counterparts in P. When both trading costs are
reasonably large, so that ￿H and ￿L are small, both countries are incompletely specialized, much
as they are in autarky. A su¢ cient reduction in the cost of trading the high-quality goods, holding
￿L ￿xed at a reasonably low level, generates an equilibrium in which the poor country P produces
only low-quality goods, while the rich country R produces both high- and low-quality goods. Sim-
ilarly, a su¢ cient reduction in the cost of trading low-quality goods, holding ￿H at a reasonably
low level, results in an equilibrium in which R produces only high-quality goods while P produces
goods in both quality classes. If the cost of transporting both goods is su¢ ciently small, each class
of goods is produced in a single location. We study this latter type of equilibrium in greater depth
in the next section.
29The parameters for Figure 2 are N
R = N
P = 1000, H = 0:9, L = 0:75, ￿H = ￿L = 0:6, ￿L = 0:5, fH = 20,
fL = 1:5, cH = 0:3, and cL = 0:05:
20Figure 3: Patterns of specialization
5 Trade with Specialization
In a trade equilibrium, high transport costs allow ￿rms in each country to enter pro￿tably in
both quality segments of the market for di⁄erentiated products. Even if there are relatively many
foreign producers of a given quality level, local ￿rms can enter to sell to local customers thanks to
the protection a⁄orded by the high shipping costs. As we have seen, when ￿H and ￿L are su¢ ciently
close to zero, the trade equilibrium is characterized by incomplete specialization in both countries.
As transport costs fall, it becomes more di¢ cult for ￿rms in a smaller market to overcome
the disadvantage of their lesser local demand. Eventually, as ￿q rises toward one, the number of
producers of quality q in some country must fall to zero, as is implied by equation (16). For still
smaller transport costs, all of the varieties with quality q are produced in a single country. In this
section, we study trade equilibria with specialization of this sort. We are particularly interested
in the limiting equilibrium, as transport costs approach zero. We will see that this equilibrium is
unique and has a readily understood pattern of trade. Before beginning this analysis, however, it
will prove useful to have a brief discussion of the integrated equilibrium, when transport costs for
both quality levels are literally zero.
5.1 The Integrated Equilibrium
Suppose that ￿H = ￿L = 0, so that ￿H = ￿L = 1. With no supply-side sources of comparative
advantage, there is nothing in our model to pin down the location of production. Factor-price
equalization and zero transport costs means that the di⁄erent goods can be produced in various
21combinations in the two countries, without consequence for any aggregate variables or anyone￿ s
welfare level. Although we cannot say anything about the pattern of trade, we can nonetheless
characterize the integrated equilibrium in terms of the total numbers of brands of each quality that
are produced and the average welfare of the di⁄erent income groups.
In the absence of trade costs, the e⁄ective number of varieties with quality q is the same in both
countries; i.e., ~ nR
q = ~ nP
q = nR
q + nP
q for q = H;L. We can solve for these aggregate numbers of
varieties using the autarky equilibrium conditions for an economy with population NR + NP and
an income distribution that is the composite of the separate distributions in the two countries. This
gives ￿ nH and ￿ nL, the aggregate numbers of high- and low-quality products, respectively, that are
produced in the integrated global economy. Armed with these variables, we can calculate aggregate















The impact of trade with zero transport costs on the welfare of an income group y in country k
re￿ ects a scale e⁄ect and a composition e⁄ect, as before. The scale e⁄ect￿ which arises because the
integrated economy has a larger population than either separate economy￿ works to the bene￿t
of all income groups in both countries. The composition e⁄ect bene￿ts the high-income groups
in country k if the relative number of high-quality brands in the integrated equilibrium exceeds
the relative number of high-quality brands in the country￿ s autarky equilibrium. Otherwise, the
composition e⁄ect bene￿ts the low-income groups in country k. The e⁄ect of an opening of trade
on the relative numbers of brands of the di⁄erent qualities levels re￿ ects both the biased nature of
growth due to ￿H > ￿L, and the demand e⁄ects of a change in income distribution from one with
the properties of the local economy to one with the properties of the global economy.
5.2 Trade Equilibrium with Small (but Positive) Trade Costs
Now we are ready to characterize the trade equilibrium when transport costs are positive but small.
If a ￿rm producing quality q in country k is to break even, it must attain total worldwide sales of
xq = fqq=￿q. Each ￿rms￿sales comprise its home sales￿ dk
q for a ￿rm in country k￿ and its export
sales, which are a fraction ￿q of the domestic sales of a foreign ￿rm. For ￿rms producing quality q
to achieve the break-even volume of sales in both countries given the required relationship between
the home sales of one and the export sales of the other requires that domestic sales be common to
the two countries; i.e., dR
q = dP
q , as we have noted before.
But note that the aggregate demand in country k for a typical variety with quality q approaches
￿ dk
q as transport costs go to zero. The aggregate demands of the integrated equilibrium are given
by (18) and are uniquely determined by parameters of the world economy. Only exceptionally will
it happen that ￿ dR
q = ￿ dP
q for q = H or q = L. In other words, only exceptionally will it happen
that ￿rms in both countries producing a given quality can break even when transport costs are
22su¢ ciently small. Otherwise, goods of a particular quality are produced in a single country, while a
potential entrant at that quality level in the other country ￿nds insu¢ cient demand (at its optimal
price) to cover its ￿xed costs.30
Which country produces each class of goods when trade costs are small? To answer this question,
we look at national demands for products of a given quality in the integrated equilibrium. Suppose,
for example that ￿ dR
q > ￿ dP
q for products of quality q; that is, the typical producer of a good with
quality q makes greater sales in country R than in country P. With positive trade costs and optimal
pricing, each ￿rm￿ s exports are a fraction of sales by a local producer in the destination market. It
follows that when transport costs are su¢ ciently small, pro￿ts per ￿rm for a producer of a brand
with quality q in country R must exceed those for a producer of that quality in country P.31 More
generally, all production of goods with quality q takes place in the country with the larger domestic
market for goods of that quality in the integrated equilibrium. We summarize in
Proposition 4 Suppose ￿ dk
q > ￿ d‘
q for q 2 fH;Lg; k;‘ = R;P; and ‘ 6= k. Then, for ￿H and ￿L
su¢ ciently close to zero, all goods of quality q are produced in country k.
Let us apply Proposition 4 to some special cases that we have considered previously. Suppose,
for example, that GR = GP and NR > NP; i.e., the countries share the same income distribution
but di⁄er in size. Then, by (18), ￿ dR
H > ￿ dP
H and ￿ dR
L > ￿ dP
L, so the larger country produces and
exports all varieties of both the high-quality and low￿ quality di⁄erentiated products. Now suppose
instead that NR = NP while GR (￿) ￿rst-order stochastically dominates GR (￿). Then ￿ dR
H > ￿ dP
H
and ￿ dR
L < ￿ dP
L, so the richer country produces all of the high-quality goods while the poorer country
produces all of the low-quality goods. We record these results in
Corollary 1 Suppose that transport costs are small. (i) If GR (y) = GP (y) for all y and NR >
NP, then nP
H = nP
L = 0 and only R produces and exports goods of quality H and L. (ii) If
NR = NP and GR (y) < GP (y) for all y, then nP
H = nR
L = 0, only R produces and exports goods
of quality H, and only P produces and exports goods of quality L.
We can also readily examine the e⁄ects of a fall in trading costs in an equilibrium with special-
ization by quality level. Suppose, for example, that only R produces high-quality goods while only
30In the literature on the New Economic Geography, it is common to have diversi￿cation for high transport costs
but specialization for low transport costs. In these models, if the locations have no inherent productivity or cost
advantages, the equilibrium with zero transport costs is indeterminate; see, for example, Rossi-Hansberg (2005). More
generally, Krugman (1991a,1991b) was the ￿rst to point out an inverted-U shaped relationship between specialization
and transport costs when the various locations have inherent advantages. See Aiginger and Rossi-Hansberg (2006)
for a fuller discussion of this issue.




































q , where ￿
k
q is the net pro￿t of a typical producer of quality q in country k.
23P produces low-quality goods, as when the countries are of similar size and the income distribution
in R ￿rst-order stochastically dominates that in P. Since every consumer buys one unit of the
di⁄erentiated product of some quality level or another,
nLxL + nHxH = NR + NP, (19)
where nq is the equilibrium number of varieties of quality q, all produced in R for q = H and all
produced in P for q = L, and xq is the break-even quantity of sales per ￿rm for producers of goods
with quality q as before. This linear relationships implies that a change in trade costs that induces
entry at one quality level in the country where that quality is produced also forces exit of producers
of the other quality level, in the other country.
Next we can use (14) to calculate per capita domestic sales for each type of ￿rm, recogniz-
ing that ~ nR
H = nH, ~ nR
L = ￿LnL, ~ nP
H = ￿HnH, and ~ nP











typical producer of a low-quality good in P. The fact that total sales by each type of ￿rm must
attain the break-even level gives us two more equations for nH and nL, one of which is redundant
given (19).32
Suppose now that the cost of transporting high-quality goods falls. This shifts demand toward
the (imported) high-quality products in P, without a⁄ecting demands in R (at the initial numbers
of brands). The shift in the composition of demand induces additional entry by producers of high-
quality goods in R, while some producers of low-quality goods in P are forced to exit the market.
Then, in both countries, the e⁄ective number of high-quality brands rises while the e⁄ective number
of low-quality brands falls. From (17), we see that the wealthiest consumers in both countries must
gain, while the poorest consumers in both countries may gain or lose. The consequences of a
reduction in the cost of shipping low-quality goods are analogous￿ the variety of low-quality goods
expands and that of high-quality goods contracts in each country, to the bene￿t of poor consumers
and the possible detriment of those who are well-o⁄.
6 Commercial Policy
We turn to the impact of commercial policy. With ￿xed markups over delivered costs, tari⁄s do
not alter the terms of trade. All welfare e⁄ects of tari⁄s emanate from the induced entry and exit
of ￿rms producing at di⁄erent quality levels and from the shifts in the distribution of income that
result from the disposition of tari⁄ revenue.
The novel e⁄ects of tari⁄s in our model are well illustrated in a simple setting in which trans-
portation costs are positive but close to zero and each quality class is produced in only one country.
We assume that R produces all varieties of high-quality products while P produces all varieties of
low-quality products and examine a speci￿c tari⁄ of t per unit that is introduced in country R.33
32Details of these equations and their comparative statics can be found in the appendix.
33In this setting with specialization, a tari⁄ on all imports in country R is indistinguishable from a tari⁄ on imports
24In this setting with non-homothetic demands, the manner of redistribution of government revenues
in￿ uences the e⁄ects of tari⁄s on aggregate demand. For concreteness, we assume that tari⁄s are
redistributed to consumers on an equal per-capita basis. Each consumer receives additional income
of r = tnLdR
L=NR, where dR
L is the aggregate demand for a typical (imported) low-quality product
in country R.
A tari⁄ raises the relative price of low-quality goods in country R. Considering both the price





























Note that r = tnLdR
L=NR = t￿R





< 0, so the tari⁄-cum-redistribution
shifts demand in R from low-quality goods to high-quality goods, for given numbers of each type
of product. Consequently, the tari⁄ induces entry of ￿rms producing high-quality goods in R and
exit by ￿rms producing low-quality goods in P.
How does the tari⁄ a⁄ect the welfare of di⁄erent income groups in country R? The average
welfare of individuals with income y in country R can be written analogously to (12) as
vR(y) = n
￿H
H ￿H (y)erH + n
￿L
L ￿L (y)e(r￿t)L .
Di⁄erentiating the expression for vR(y) at t = 0 and using (19) and the market-clearing condition,
nqxq = ￿R
q NR +￿P
q NP, we can express the impact of a small tari⁄ on the average welfare of those
with income y in country R as



























where ￿ ￿q = nqxq=
￿
NR + NP￿
is the fraction of consumers worldwide who buy a di⁄erentiated
product with quality q. The right-hand side of (20) combines two terms, a composition e⁄ect and
a redistribution e⁄ect. The composition e⁄ect should be familiar. It re￿ ects the rise in the number
of high-quality varieties and the fall in the number of low-quality varieties induced by the tari⁄.
The richest income group in R buys a greater fraction of high-quality goods and a smaller fraction
of low-quality goods than the average consumer in the world economy; i.e., ￿R
H (ymax) > ￿ ￿H and
￿R
L (ymax) < ￿ ￿L. Therefore, since ￿H > ￿L, the composition e⁄ect certainly bene￿ts the richest
of low-quality goods.
25income group in country R. However, the poorest income group in that country may well lose from
the change in the composition of di⁄erentiated products.
The redistribution e⁄ect re￿ ects the transfers of income implied by the lump-sum redistribution
of tari⁄ revenues. The tari⁄ transfers income from those who chose to purchase an imported, low-
quality product to those who choose to purchase a domestic, high-quality product. The rich are
more likely to buy a high-quality product than the poor, so they are most likely to bene￿t from
these transfers. Indeed, for the richest income group, ￿R
H (ymax) > ￿R
H and ￿R
L (ymax) < ￿R
L and
the members of this group must gain on average from the redistribution e⁄ect as well. But notice
that the redistribution e⁄ect might also bene￿t the poor, since H > L. This is because the tari⁄
transfers income from those in any income class who happen to prefer one of the low-quality varieties
to those in that same class who happen to prefer one of the high-quality varieties. The latter group
has a higher marginal utility of income due to the complementarity in preferences between quality
of the di⁄erentiated good and quantity of the numeraire good. If the quality di⁄erence between













case the redistribution e⁄ects of a small tari⁄serves to bene￿t even the poorest income group in R.
Indeed, the combined composition and redistribution e⁄ect can be positive for those with income
ymin, in which case a tari⁄ would raise the average welfare of every income group in R, despite the
absence of any terms-of-trade improvement.34
7 Trade with Many Quality Levels and Many Countries
In this section, we extend our analysis of the trade pattern to the general case with many quality
levels and many countries. In so doing, we are able to make contact with the empirical evidence
on vertical specialization cited in the Introduction, much of which bears on a country￿ s relative
exports to di⁄erent markets or its relative imports from di⁄erent suppliers. To address such issues,
we need to examine a setting with more than two countries.
We now assume that there is an arbitrary set Q of quality levels indexed by q and K countries
indexed by k. We suppose that all countries are of equal size and normalize their populations so
that Nk = 1 for k = 1;2;:::;K. By neglecting variation in country size, we can focus on di⁄erences
in the level and distribution of income without invoking a taxonomy of cases. Our key assumption
in this section is that countries can be ordered unambiguously from poorest to richest. In particular,
we will assume that the income distributions in any pair of countries k and k0 satisfy the monotone
likelihood ratio property (MLRP), namely





gk(y) for all y0 > y ￿ ymin;
where gk(y) ￿ dGk(y)=dy is the probability density function for income in country k. In words,
Assumption 2 says that when comparing any two countries and any two income levels, the richer
34A small tari⁄ raises the average welfare of all income groups, for example, when the parameters take the values
that were used to generate Figure 1.
26country (with the higher country index) has relatively more consumers at the higher level of income.
This is a somewhat stronger assumption on the ordering of income distributions than that of ￿rst-
order stochastic dominance￿ which we used in the preceding sections￿ but we shall need it for the
statements that follow.
The trading environment is a straightforward extension of the closed-economy model described
in Sections 2 and 3. All countries share the same technologies and the same distributions of
consumer preferences over varieties. All exports of goods of quality q incur a per-unit shipping
cost of ￿q, regardless of source or destination. These shipping costs give rise to an ￿adjustment￿








q; q 2 Q, k;‘ = 1;:::;K. (21)
















; q 2 Q, k = 1;:::;K; (22)
while purchases of a typical imported variety with this quality are ￿qdk
q. We denote the right-hand




, where ~ nk is the vector of e⁄ective varieties available in country k with
typical element ~ nk
q. An important property of these aggregate demands is captured in the following
lemma.35
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 2, the function ￿k










for all k0 > k and q0 > q.
The lemma says that if the same e⁄ective variety is available in two countries, the relative demand
for the higher quality goods will be greater in the richer country.36 This property of the demand
system puts a great deal of structure on the home-market e⁄ects, which in turn guide the trade
patterns in a world economy satisfying the MLRP in incomes.
As before, we consider in turn the two extreme possibilities concerning the size of transport
costs. First, we assume that trading costs are su¢ ciently large that all quality levels are produced
in every country. Then we assume that trading costs are su¢ ciently small that every quality level
is produced in only one country. In each of these cases, we are able to derive strong predictions
about the bilateral trade ￿ ows that mirror patterns found in the data.
35The proof, which relies on Lemma 2 in Athey (2002) that is orginally due to Ahlswede and Daykin (1978), is
given in the appendix.
36Note that this statement does not rely on the countries being of equal size. That is, we could instead de￿ne
￿
k
q(~ n) as the right hand side of (22) multiplied by N
k, and the inequality cited in the lemma would still apply.
277.1 Large Transport Costs
We know, as before, that all qualities are produced in every country in the autarky equilibrium.
Such a pattern of diversi￿ed production also obtains in a trade equilibrium when transport costs are
su¢ ciently high. We examine now an equilibrium in which every country produces some varieties
in all quality segments.
If production of quality q takes place in country k, then total sales by ￿rms in this country
must match the break-even quantity, xq = fqq=￿q. This implies, as in the case with two countries,
that all ￿rms producing quality q make the same local sales and the same export sales (in total,
and in each individual market), no matter where in the world they are located.37 In the bilateral
trade between country k and country k0, the latter will be a net exporter of varieties of quality q
if and only if there are more varieties with this quality produced in k0 than in k; i.e., if and only if
nk0
q > nk
q. But it is straightforward to show, as we did for the case of two countries, that nk0
q > nk
q
if and only if ~ nk0
q > ~ nk
q.38 To ￿nd the pattern of bilateral trade between any pair of countries for
any quality level, we need only ￿nd which country enjoys a larger e⁄ective number of varieties in
the trade equilibrium.
In the appendix we establish the following lemma concerning the relative e⁄ective variety of
two di⁄erent quality levels available in any pair of countries.
Lemma 2 Suppose that some varieties of q and q0 are produced in countries k and k0. Then, under










for k0 > k and q0 > q:
The lemma says that a relatively greater e⁄ective number of varieties of a higher-quality good is
consumed in a richer country than in a poorer country. Intuitively, if the e⁄ective variety were the
same in the two countries, then by Lemma 1, the richer country would have the relatively larger
domestic market for the higher-quality product. This would mean that producers of the higher-
quality good could make relatively greater pro￿ts in the richer country than in the poorer country
thanks to their savings on transport costs. But this implies that there would be incentives for entry
of suppliers of the higher quality good in the richer country or incentives for entry of suppliers
of the lower quality good in the poorer country. Of course, in equilibrium, all ￿rms must make














1 + ￿q (K ￿ 1)
for all q 2 Q and all k = 1;:::;K.




q units of this good to every foreign market.
38From the de￿nition of e⁄ective variety in k and k















for all k and k
0 and for all q 2 Q.
28zero pro￿ts in all market segments and locations. Under Assumption 1, which ensures that higher
quality goods also are more dissimilar, the relative incentives for entry at ~ nk = ~ nk0
are mirrored in
the relative e⁄ective numbers of varieties in the trade equilibrium.
Now we can describe the bilateral trade pattern between k and k0. Suppose that country k0
has positive net exports of goods with quality q in its trade with country k. This requires, as we
have seen, that there be more e⁄ective varieties of q consumed in k0 than in k; i.e., ~ nk0
q > ~ nk
q. But
then Lemma 2 implies that the richer country also consumes more e⁄ective variety of quality q0 for
q0 > q than does the poorer country, which in turn implies that the richer country also has positive
net exports of quality q0 in its trade with the poorer country. More formally, we have
Proposition 5 Suppose that all countries are of equal size and all quality levels are produced in
all countries. Then, under Assumptions 1 and 2, for every pair of countries k and k0, k0 > k, there
exists a quality level q￿ (k;k0) such that country k0 exports on net to country k all goods with quality
greater than or equal to q￿ (k;k0) and imports on net all goods with quality less than q￿ (k;k0).
Proposition 5 generalizes part ii of Proposition 2 to the case of many countries and many quality
levels. It provides su¢ cient conditions under which a richer country has positive net exports of all
the highest quality goods and positive net imports of all the lowest quality goods in its bilateral
trade with a poorer country.
Proposition 5 implies that the average quality of a country￿ s exports is increasing in k, in keeping
with the ￿ndings by Schott (2004) and Hummels and Klenow (2005). In fact, the proposition o⁄ers
a stronger prediction; it suggests that in all bilateral trades, the basket of goods that a richer
country exports to a poorer country should be of higher average quality than the basket of goods
that ￿ ow in the opposite direction.
7.2 Small Transport Costs
We now consider the opposite extreme case in which transport costs are quite small. As we know,
if two countries both produce varieties in the same quality segment, then ￿rms in each country
must make the same domestic sales.39 But, in the limit as the vector of transport costs becomes
vanishingly small, the domestic sales of each ￿rm approach those of the integrated equilibrium.
Only exceptionally will the aggregate demands for a given quality level coincide in two countries
in the integrated equilibrium. It follows that, generically, varieties of a given quality level are only
produced in one country in a trade equilibrium with small transport costs. Moreover, even allowing
for exceptional income distributions, any two countries can produce at most one quality level in
common.40
39The argument is the same as in footnote 37.
40Suppose, to the contrary that countries k and k










q0. In the limit, as all transport costs vanish (￿q ! 1 for all q) this implies ￿
k
q (￿ n) = ￿
k0
q (￿ n) and ￿
k
q0 (￿ n) =
￿
k0
q0 (￿ n), where ￿ n is the vector of total varieties in the integrated equilibrium. But this pair of equalities contradicts
Lemma 1, so the two countries cannot in fact share in production of these two quality levels.
29Which quality levels are produced in which countries? The answer is provided in the following
proposition, the proof of which appears in the appendix.
Proposition 6 Suppose that all countries are of equal size and each quality level is produced in
only one country. Then, under Assumption 2, if country k produces quality q and country k0 > k
produces quality q0, then q0 > q.
The proposition does not rule out the possibility that some countries produce more than one quality
level or that others produce none at all. But it does indicate that the higher the quality level of a
product, the richer is the country that produces it. The result follows from the home-market e⁄ect,
which, as in the case with two countries, becomes overwhelmingly strong as transport costs go to
zero. Production of a good is concentrated in the country that has the largest home market and
richer countries have larger markets than poorer countries for higher quality goods.
Proposition 6 has strong implications for the trade ￿ ows. First, the pattern of specialization
implies immediately that every country imports higher quality goods from richer countries. This is
consistent with the ￿ndings by Schott (2004), Khandelwal (2010) and Hallak and Schott (2011) of a
positive correlation between the quality of goods imported by the United States and the per capita
GDP of the exporting country. Second, richer countries import relatively more from countries
that produce goods of higher quality. This result, which is in keeping with the empirical evidence
provided by Hallak (2006), follows from the fact that, when transport costs are small, the relative
demand for a higher quality good must be greater in a richer country, as indicated in Lemma 1.
Third, suppose that a country exports goods in two quality segments, q and q0, with q0 > q. This
country will export relatively more of the higher quality goods to the richer market. This too
follows from Lemma 1 which implies that, when transport costs are small, the relative demand for
the higher quality good must be greater in the richer country. More formally, we have established
Proposition 7 Suppose that k0 > k and that transport costs are vanishingly small. Under As-
sumption 2, if countries k and k0 import goods of quality q and q0 with q0 > q, then k0 imports
relatively more of quality q0.
Notice that this proposition does not require that countries k and k0 be of equal size, for the reason
stated in footnote 36; i.e., the ordering of relative aggregate demands for alternative quality levels
in two markets is independent of the sizes of those markets. Proposition 7 yields the following
immediate corollary concerning a country￿ s exports to multiple markets.
Corollary 2 Suppose that transport costs are vanishingly small. If country k produces varieties
in two quality segments, it exports relatively more of the higher-quality goods to a relatively richer
market.
Finally, consider a country that exports varieties of a given quality to two di⁄erent markets.
Controlling for the sizes of the importing countries, the exporter￿ s sales are greater in the country
30whose income ranking is more similar to its own.41 This prediction is in the spirit of the Linder
hypothesis and the empirical evidence provided by Hallak (2010).
8 Concluding Remarks
We have developed a tractable model of trade in vertically and horizontally di⁄erentiated prod-
ucts. The model features discrete quality choices by consumers who di⁄er in income levels and
non-homothetic aggregate demands for goods of di⁄erent qualities. The non-hometheticity in de-
mand re￿ ects a complementarity in individual preferences between the quality of the di⁄erentiated
product and the quantity of a homogeneous good. Consumers have idiosyncratic components in
their evaluations of the available varieties of the di⁄erentiated product. The distribution of taste
parameters in the population generates a nested-logit system of product demands.
We have embedded such consumers in a simple, supply-side environment. Goods are produced
from labor alone, with constant returns to scale in the homogeneous-good industry and ￿xed and
constant-variable costs for the varieties of the di⁄erentiated products. The number of varieties at
each quality level is determined by free entry in a monopolistically-competitive, general equilibrium.
Transport costs impede trade between countries that di⁄er in size and in their income distributions
but are otherwise similar. In this setting, a large home market for goods of a given quality confers
a competitive advantage to ￿rms located there, which renders them as net exporters in the trade
equilibrium.
Our model yields predictions about the pattern of trade that are consistent with the empirical
evidence. For example, we ￿nd that, among countries of similar size, the richer countries export
goods of higher average quality. This is in keeping with the empirical ￿ndings by Schott (2004)
and Hummels and Klenow (2005). When trading costs are small, a country imports higher-quality
goods from richer trading partners, as Schott (2004), Khandelwal (2010) and Hallak and Schott
(2011) have found to be true in the U.S. bilateral trade data. When a country exports varieties of
a given quality to two di⁄erent markets of similar size, it exports a greater volume to the country
whose income ranking is more similar to its own.
Our framework lends itself readily to welfare analysis. We can decompose the welfare impact on
a particular income group of, for example, reductions in trading costs into a cost-savings e⁄ect and
a composition e⁄ect. The former tends to bene￿t all consumers, whereas the latter￿ re￿ ecting the
induced change in the relative number of low- and high-quality products￿ often bene￿ts consumers
at one end of the income distribution at the expense of those at the other. We ￿nd that, in the
absence of supply-side determinants of comparative advantage, trade between countries at di⁄erent
41Suppose that k
00 > k
0 > k and consider the exports of k of some quality q to k
0and k
00 when transport costs are













0 > q is the quality of some varieties produced and exported only by country k
0. Since q
0 is produced in k
0









q ; i.e., the market for goods of quality q must be larger in k
0 than in k
00.
The same argument applies when k > k
0 > k
00, once we note that q > q
0 in this case.
31levels of income tends to bene￿t on average the poorer consumers in the richer country and the
richer consumers in the poorer country. These income groups gain from integration not only because
imports provide a wider variety of choices, but also because trade shifts the composition of available
products toward those goods that they are most likely to buy.
Our nested logit demand system is familiar from the empirical literature. For this reason, we
believe that it would be possible to estimate key parameters of the model from data on household in-
come and spending. Armed with such estimates, one could calculate the distributional implications
of trade for di⁄erent consumer groups.
Finally, our framework is simple enough to allow for extensions and variations. For example, it
is straightforward to introduce direct foreign investment as an alternative means for ￿rms to serve
foreign markets. Then the model could shed light on the spread of Chinese and Indian multinational
corporations to other developing countries (see Boston Consulting Group, 2006). We are pursuing
such an extension in our ongoing research.
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9.1 Proof of Proposition 1






















































































































Combinations of nH and nL that satisfy (A1) are depicted by the curve GG in Figure 4. Equation (A1) is
satis￿ed in the limit as nL = nH ! 0. Moreover, the curve GG is everywhere upward sloping. As the ￿gure
shows, if the GG curve begins at the origin and slopes upward, it surely must cross the NN line￿ which
represents equation (10)￿ and can do so only once.
9.2 Comparative Statics of the Autarky Equilibrium
De￿ne















so that (A1) implies E[  (y;nL;nH)] = 0. Since ￿H (y)=￿L (y) is increasing in y, @ =@y > 0. Note also that
@ =@nH > 0 and @ =@nL < 0.
9.2.1 Population size
Divide the numerator and denominator of the expression in square brackets in the de￿nition of   by N, to
de￿ne ~   ￿ ~   (y; ￿ nH; ￿ nL;N), where ￿ nq = nq=N. That is,

























Figure 4: Autarky equilibrium
Since ￿H > ￿L by Assumption 1, ~   is increasing in both ￿ nL and N. With (10), this implies ^ nL < ^ N < ^ nH.
9.2.2 First-order stochastic dominance
The fact that @ =@y > 0 implies, with (10), @ =@nH > 0 and @ =@nL < 0, that nH rises and nL falls as
the income distribution shifts to the right.
9.2.3 Mean-preserving spread















































































￿ nLxL + N
#￿2
N (nHxH)











Therefore, @2 =@y2 < 0 if and only if






























, ￿L (y) > ￿H (y) .
It follows that if ￿L (y) > 1=2 for all y, a mean-preserving spread will increase nH and decrease nL.
9.3 Comparative Statics of Trade Equilibrium with Diversi￿ed Production



































































to solve for ~ nk
H and substitute into  























































































It follows that d 
k=d￿H < 0 and therefore d~ nk
L=d￿H < 0.
Now consider an equiproportionate increase in 1 + ￿H and 1 + ￿L. De￿ne ￿ nk
q = nk

































It is clear from this equation that an equiproportionate increase in 1 + ￿H and and 1 + ￿L has the same
e⁄ect on ￿ nk
i as an increase in N.
9.4 Equilibrium Numbers of Brands with Small Trade Costs
The aggregate demand condition is
nLxL + nHxH = NR + NP .


















































































Now we can follow similar steps to those used in the derivation of (A1). Note that the ￿rst term in square
brackets is the same as the term in square brackets in that derivation, except that we have ￿
￿H
H ￿H (y) in


























































































Note that d 
k=dnL < 0, which implies that the equilibrium is unique. Moreover, d 
P=d￿H < 0 and
d 
R=d￿H = 0. Therefore, dnL=d￿H < 0.
9.5 Many Countries and Many Quality Levels
9.5.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Note that ￿q (y) = e(y￿cq)q￿￿q is strictly log supermodular in (y;q); i.e., ￿q0 (y0)=￿q (y0) > ￿q0 (y00)=￿q (y00)
for all q;q0 2 Q, q0 > q and y0 > y00 ￿ ymin. Therefore, Assumption 2 implies that ￿q (y)gk (y) is strictly
log supermodular in (y;q;k) and so is ￿q (y)gk (y)=(~ nq)
1￿￿q P
!2Q (~ n!)
￿! ￿! (y). It follows from Lemma 2
in Athey (2002), due originally to Ahlswede and Daykin (1978), that ￿k
q (~ n) is strictly log supermodular in
40(q;k) inasmuch integration preserves log supermodularity.
9.5.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose that a set of quality levels Q ￿ Q are produced in countries k 2 K ￿f1;2;:::;Kg, then the demand




1 + ￿q (K ￿ 1)























; for q 2 Q; k;k0 2 K; (A2)
where
￿k























































for y0 > y00 and k0 > k, where the inequality results from log supermodularity of gk (y). Next note that (A2)


















































































dy represents a weighted average of ￿q0 (y)=￿q (y). How-



















so that in country k0 (where k0 > k) the weights are relatively larger for larger income levels. Moreover,



















































for q;q0 2 Q; k;k0 2 K; q0 > q and k0 > k:
9.5.3 Proof of Proposition 6
Suppose, to the contrary, that q0 < q. It follows from the fact that producers of quality q in k and of quality
q0 in k0 must break even and from the fact that there must be no pro￿t opportunities for producers of quality




































































For ￿ #(1;1;:::;1) we have ~ nk ! ￿ n and ~ nk
0
! ￿ n, which contradicts Lemma 1 when q0 < q. Therefore, the
richer country must produce the goods of higher quality.
42